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Eliciting Mental Models: a Comparison of Interview Procedures in the
Context of Natural Resource Management
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ABSTRACT. The sustainable management of natural resources largely depends on people’s conceptions of environmental systems
and how they function. The mental model construct provides an appropriate means to explore the cognitive dimension of people’s
interactions with such systems. Mental models are cognitive representations of external reality that people use as the basis for acting
with and within the world around them. We aimed to improve the application of the mental model construct to the field of natural
resource management, with an emphasis on creek, i.e., stream, systems, by exploring how certain elicitation procedures may affect the
mental models expressed. One of the initial hurdles that must be overcome is to work out how to effectively elicit people’s mental models
of complex, dynamic phenomena. By improving their understanding of mental model elicitation procedures, researchers can make
better use of the mental model construct to further explore the cognitive and social dimensions of human–environment interactions.
The procedures compared were oral interviews and a drawing task with oral commentary, conducted at either a creek location, where
visual cues were available, or in the interviewee’s home. We found that the location of the interview had a greater effect on the expressed
mental models than the interview task. The locations also evoked different emphases in the mental models: those elicited by a creek
featured more concepts and were more specific, whereas those elicited at home were typically more generic and dense. The interview
task was found to have minimal effect on the mental models expressed.
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INTRODUCTION
Researchers within the field of natural resource management
(NRM) are increasingly recognizing the value of exploring the
cognitive dimensions of human–environment interactions (Abel
et al. 1998, Walker et al. 2006). In recent years, research attention
has been directed away from how people “ought” to make
decisions and toward exploring the cognitive structures that
underpin people’s reasoning, decision making, and behavior
(Beratan 2007, Etienne et al. 2011, Mathevet et al. 2011, Lynam
et al. 2012). Although environmental cognition, i.e., the study of
how individuals structure their thinking about environmental
issues, how they learn these cognitions, and how these cognitions
influence behaviors (Henry and Dietz 2012), has been a well-
established domain of research since the work of Moore and
Golledge (1976), its application to NRM contexts raises specific
methodological challenges. For example, NRM researchers
require methods that enable them to study people’s conceptions
of environmental systems, which are both complex and dynamic.
They also require methods that are suitable for use in field settings,
as opposed to laboratory settings, and must therefore take into
account situational factors that can affect cognition, such as
sensory cues and mood (Smith and Semin 2004).  
NRM researchers and practitioners are particularly interested in
gaining insight into the cognitive structures that frame peoples’
interactions with complex and dynamic environments and
exploring how these structures may differ between individuals and
social groups (Abel et al. 1998, Özesmi and Özesmi 2004, Dray
et al. 2006, Baynes et al. 2011, Etienne et al. 2011, Stone-Jovicich
et al. 2011, Lynam et al. 2012). The mental model construct has
been identified as a suitable means for examining cognition in the
context of NRM because it captures how people dynamically
conceive environmental systems to function. Mental models are
internal cognitive structures that guide people’s interactions with
the world around them (Craik 1943, Johnson-Laird 1983).
Understanding people’s mental models can provide key insights
into the human management of environmental systems. It is not
possible to directly access other people’s thinking. Researchers
must therefore rely on techniques designed to elicit and represent
mental models that do not involve direct observation or
measurement. Despite considerable attention to methods of
elicitation, little of this has critically examined the effects of
different elicitation procedures on expressed mental models
(Jones et al. 2011). If  the mental model construct is to be used in
NRM as a means to explore people’s cognition of environment-
related systems, further research is necessary to enhance our
understanding of how elicitation methods and tools can influence
the representations made of those mental models, and indeed
possibly influence the cognitive structures targeted during the
elicitation process (Lynam et al. 2012). We explored the effects of
different elicitation procedures on the content and relations of
expressed mental models of complex and dynamic phenomena
associated with NRM. The term “elicitation” refers to the process
of inquiry to encourage a person to externalize a mental model.
An “expressed mental model” is that which a person conveys in
an interview situation, i.e., through the elicitation process.
MENTAL MODELS AND THEIR ELICITATION
The psychology and cognitive science literature (Johnson-Laird
1983, Matlin 1998) asserts that people must be able to represent
the external world mentally to interact with it. The definition of
a mental model as a cognitive representational structure overlaps
with a number of other cognitive constructs, such as schema
(Brewer and Trevens 1981). A key feature of a mental model that
differentiates it from those constructs, however, is that it is a
“dynamic” representation that can be run like a simulation,
allowing an individual to test different scenarios before acting
(Craik 1943). This definition of a mental model is suited to its
application within the field of NRM, which features interacting
social and ecological processes, and so is the definition we have
adopted. We largely focus on the dynamic function of mental
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models because this is what differentiates them from other
structures. An overview of how the mental model construct has
been used in the field of NRM, including a summary of elicitation
procedures applied, is provided by Jones et al. (2011). A review
of the NRM literature shows that mental models have been
elicited to understand the basis for people’s actions (Baynes et al.
2011); to integrate different perspectives to improve the overall
understanding of a given system (Özesmi and Özesmi 2004); to
explore similarities and differences in stakeholders’ understanding
to improve communication (Abel et al. 1998); and to support
decision-making and negotiation processes in contentious
situations (Dray et al. 2006).  
A variety of mental model elicitation procedures have been used
in different disciplines to suit different research contexts and
purposes, including, for example, the study of system dynamics
(Doyle et al. 2008), human–computer interaction (Cooke 1999),
and risk communication (Morgan et al. 2002). A review of
elicitation procedures used reveals that they differ in terms of two
key dimensions: (1) a situated and nonsituated dimension and (2)
an oral- and visual-based dimension. These dimensions provide
a starting point to begin exploring how different interview
procedures might affect the mental models people express in an
elicitation exercise. The difference between situated and
nonsituated procedures concerns the location in which the
elicitation interview is conducted. “Situated” procedures involve
eliciting a person’s mental model in a location corresponding to
the phenomena to be elicited, as performed by Abel et al. (1998)
for example. A “nonsituated” procedure involves eliciting a
person’s mental model in a location removed from the phenomena
of interest. The majority of mental model elicitation procedures
are conducted as a nonsituated interview (Etienne et al. 2011,
Stone-Jovicich et al. 2011). That is, mental models are typically
elicited in a setting that is convenient for the interviewer and/or
interviewee, such as in the participant’s home, but not particularly
relevant to the topic of the interview. The situated versus
nonsituated procedural dimension provides an interesting point
of comparison. It enables us to explore what effect the physical
context has on the mental representations people form and use in
a given situation.  
In terms of the oral- and visual-based dimension, Carley and
Palmquist (1992) advocate the use of oral-based procedures. They
state that the symbolic or verbal structure extracted from a text,
such as an interview transcript, can be considered a sample of the
full symbolic representation of the individual’s cognitive
structure. They believe that language provides a “window through
which to view the individuals mind” (Carley and Palmquist
1992:603). A common oral-based mental model elicitation
technique is the oral interview (Morgan et al. 2002). Other oral-
based techniques include semantic proximity and word
association tasks (Rowe and Cooke 1995, Langan-Fox et al.
2006). 
Kearney and Kaplan (1997) disagree that linguistic structure
alone can be taken as representative of an individual’s cognitive
structure. Instead, they incorporate an imagistic approach to
mental model elicitation. Combined oral- and visual-based
procedures are theoretically supported by studies that suggest
cognition is not only language based and that verbal and imagistic
thought are carried out by two distinct, though partly connected,
systems (Kearney and Kaplan 1997). Kearney and Kaplan claim
that semantic organization in memory may differ from the
organization of objects or concepts in memory. The visual/spatial
array created through a visual diagramming exercise is believed
to be highly compatible with human information processing
(Pezdek and Evans, cited in Kearney and Kaplan 1997). Kearney
and Kaplan (1997) acknowledge the impact that an interview
procedure can have on a person’s cognitive ability to access more
deeply held beliefs. They suggest that creating a visual
representation of one’s understanding can help the interviewee
explore his or her own mental model through the process of
“mapping” it.
METHODS
We compared four elicitation interview procedures that differ in
regard to the two dimensions outlined previously: the location of
the interview and the interview task. The procedures compared
were (1) an open-ended oral interview task and (2) an open-ended
diagrammatic-oral interview task, whereby participants were
given the opportunity to represent their understanding visually
as well as orally. These two interview tasks were compared in (1)
a “situated” and (2) a “nonsituated” context. The former involved
conducting the elicitation interview in a location corresponding
to the phenomena of interest, providing the interviewee with
immediate access to relevant perceptual cues. In this case, the
elicitation interviews were conducted in a creek, i.e., stream,
location because the interview topic concerned creek systems. The
nonsituated interviews were conducted in a neutral location,
namely in the interviewee’s home, removed from the phenomena
of interest. The four combinations were referred to as creek-oral,
house-oral, creek-diagrammatic-oral, and house-diagrammatic-
oral. 
Participants in the study were rural and peri-urban dwellers who
were members or associates of Noosa and District Landcare, a
not-for-profit volunteer-based environment organization based
in south-east Queensland, Australia. Forty people were
interviewed, i.e., 16 females and 24 males, spanning a range of
occupational backgrounds. Participants’ ages ranged from
mid-20s to late 60s. People were randomly assigned to 1 of the 4
interview procedures. Some interviewees did not complete the task
correctly, so their interviews had to be discounted in different
aspects of the data analysis. 
Twelve pilot-test interviews were conducted. The pilot-testing
phase was important in determining the level of specificity of the
topic to be covered and provided a valuable opportunity to devise
a set of guidelines for using probing questions.  
All four interview procedures were conducted as semistructured
interviews. All participants were instructed at the beginning of
the interview to respond in general terms. All interviews were
audio recorded and transcribed verbatim, and the drawings
produced in the oral-diagrammatic procedure retained.
Oral interview procedure
The following question was posed to participants at the beginning
of each semistructured oral interview: “Can you explain to me
how you understand the vegetation along the creek to affect water
quality?” Probing questions were posed according to the
interviewees’ responses by following a set of guidelines, mainly
involving “how” and “why” questions. Because we are concerned
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with the elicitation of people’s understanding of ecological
processes, i.e., the effects of vegetation on water quality in creek
systems, probing questions also involved asking participants to
extend their causal explanations when relevant. For example,
interviewees were asked: “Does that have a flow-on effect?” or
“What happens then?” Echo, or repetition probing, was also used.
To ensure that the interviewee had communicated the extent of
his or her mental model, the interviewee was asked: “Does
anything else comes to mind?” Once the interviewee indicated that
nothing else came to mind, this signaled the completion of the
interview.
Diagrammatic-oral interview procedure
For this procedure, the question was phrased as follows: “Can
you explain to me, through a picture or diagram, how you
understand the vegetation along the creek to affect water quality?”
Participants were provided with a large sheet of paper, a board
to lean on, and a variety of colored pens. Participants were asked
to draw a picture or diagram to represent their answer to the
question. They were told they could use words, pictures, or a
combination of both. They were also asked to orally explain the
picture or diagram as they drew. The probing questions asked in
the oral interviews were also used for this procedure. Logistics
were slightly different in the house-diagrammatic-oral and creek-
diagrammatic-oral procedures as outlined subsequently.
Creek-based, i.e., situated, interview procedure
The creek-based interviews took place while at a creek on or
adjacent to the interviewee’s property. For logistic reasons, one
participant was interviewed at a creek in a public location. It was
originally intended that all the creek-oral interviews would be
conducted as transect interviews (following Abel et al. 1998) and
that all the creek-diagrammatic-oral interviews would be
conducted as fixed-point interviews because of the logistic
difficulties associated with walking and drawing at the same time.
Of the creek-oral interviews, 7 interviews were carried out as
transects, whereas 3 were fixed-point interviews. This was because
of certain limitations that prevented us from walking along the
creek, including the thickness of the vegetation, property
boundaries, and the lack of access to the creek because of fences.
Nine of the 10 diagrammatic-oral interviews involved standing
in one location because it was more difficult to walk and draw at
the same time.
House-based, i.e., nonsituated, interview procedure
The house-based interviews took place within the interviewee’s
home. This procedure was straightforward, with all interviews
carried out in a similar manner.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Transcript data collected from all interviewees were systematically
compared to determine whether the interview procedures elicited
different responses from participants. Of the 20 interviewees
asked to take part in the diagrammatic interviews, 4 chose not to
draw a picture because they did not feel comfortable with the task
of drawing. The transcripts from these 4 interviews were not
analyzed. One creek-oral interview was conducted with a couple
rather than an individual. This interview transcript was also
discounted. 
Four measures were used to examine relationships between
elicitation processes and the expressed mental models: The first
was the number of concepts expressed in each mental model. The
second was the number of functional linkages, i.e., causal
relationships, expressed in each mental model. The third was the
density of the mental model or the ratio of functional links to
concepts. Finally, the fourth was the specificity of the mental
model or the proportion of the mental model that was specific
versus general.
Number of concepts elicited
Content analysis was used to determine whether patterns could
be identified across the four interview procedures in terms of the
“number” of distinct concepts expressed by participants, omitting
repetitions. The audio recordings from both the oral and
diagrammatic-oral interviews were transcribed and analyzed in
the same way. The content analysis coding process involved
identifying the concepts within each transcript (Abel et al. 1998).
We defined the concept variable as objects or nouns, such as
“nutrients” or “soil”; processes, such as “evaporation” or
“erosion”; or agents, such as “farmer” or “landowner.” An
example of the coding process is provided subsequently. The
concepts extracted from this segment of text are specified.  
“Trees” drop “leaves” on the “ground,” and all sorts of
other things. They create a “filter,” and when the “water”
goes down to our “creek” and all this “vegetation” here
helps to break the “water” so it doesn’t cause “erosion.”
It helps to prevent “erosion.” 
Once all transcripts had been coded and concepts listed in a
spreadsheet, synonyms were identified and tagged accordingly.
The final spreadsheet showed the complete list of concepts
mentioned by all interviewees, which concepts were mentioned by
which interviewees, and the synonyms, if  any, for each concept.
Totals were calculated within the spreadsheet for each of the four
interview procedures to show how many interviewees mentioned
each concept. Totals were also calculated for interviewees
participating in the creek-based interviews, the house-based
interviews, the oral interviews, and the diagrammatic-oral
interviews. With the counts of concepts reflecting a sparse and
highly dispersed data set, a generalized linear model (GLM) with
a quasi-Poisson error term and a log link function (Crawley 2007),
using the statistical software package R (R Development Core
Team 2011), was used to test the effects of the different interview
procedures on the number of concepts elicited. The test of
significance was based on a Student t test. The model and
statistical test used were selected to suit the design, taking into
consideration the sample size used and the purpose of the study.  
The GLM was applied to the data to explore two factors
associated with the experimental conditions: interview location,
i.e., creek- versus house-based, and interview task, i.e.,
diagrammatic-oral versus oral. The question was whether the
interview location, the interview task, or an interaction of
location and task affected the number and type of concepts
elicited. The model also tested whether socio-demographic
variables of the interviewees, i.e., age, gender, and occupational
background, affected the dependent variable, in this instance, the
number of concepts elicited.  
The results showed a significant effect of location on the number
of concepts expressed in an interview, with the creek-based
interviews eliciting more concepts than the house-based
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interviews (Table 1; T value = −2.718, p = 0.0104, df = 33, SE =
0.0309). There was no statistically significant difference in the
number of concepts elicited across the interview tasks, i.e.,
diagrammatic-oral versus oral.
Table 1. The mean and median number of concepts elicited using
the different interview procedures.
 Interview Group Mean Standard
Deviation
Median Range
Location
Creek 58 19.3 56 27 - 112
House
 
43
 
15.7
 
40
 
20 - 74
 
Type
Diagrammatic-oral 48 15.4 49 25 - 73
Oral 52 21.7 50 20 - 112
Number of functional linkages
The extent to which participants expressed cause-and-effect
relationships between concepts was also examined. We referred
to cause-and-effect relationships as “functional linkages.” Our
analysis sought to explore whether the different interview
procedures influenced the number of functional linkages
expressed by interviewees, as identified in the interview
transcripts. It was thus used to go beyond examining what
information was contained within the expressed mental models,
i.e., objects and concepts, to examining how that information was
organized within the expressed mental models (Carley and
Palmquist 1992). 
The methodological process of systematically extracting
relationships from a body of text is not straightforward
(Wrightson 1976, Carley 1993, Becu et al. 2003, Dray et al. 2006),
requiring the development of a comprehensive coding strategy.
In developing a coding strategy for functional linkages, an initial
choice involved defining the meaning or type(s) of relationship
(s) to be extracted from the text. We defined “functional linkage”
as an action or function, typically indicated by a verb, which links
two concepts: concept A and concept B. For example, the sentence
“the roots hold the bank” is coded as follows: concept A = “roots”;
function or action = “hold”; and concept B = “bank.” Functional
linkages identified in each transcript were recorded in a matrix
using Microsoft Excel. 
To examine the effects of the elicitation procedure on the counts
of functional linkages, a GLM using a quasi-Poisson error term
and a log link function was applied to the counts of functional
linkages. The effects of interview location, interview task, an
interaction of location and task, and socio-demographic
variables, i.e., age, gender, and occupational background, on the
number of functional linkages was examined.  
The number of expressed functional linkages did not differ across
the four elicitation procedures (Table 2). There was also no
difference across socio-demographic variables.
Mental model density
Özesmi and Özesmi (2004) assert that the ratio of relationships,
i.e., functional linkages, to concepts expressed by participants
provides a measure of density. They note that density provides an
“index of connectivity,” indicating how “connected or sparse” the
represented mental models are (Özesmi and Özesmi 2004:50). A
high density measure indicates that the interviewee perceives “a
large number of causal relationships among the variables”
(Özesmi and Özesmi 2004:50).
Table 2. Mean and median number of functional linkages elicited
using the different interview procedures.
 Interview Group Mean Standard
Deviation
Median Range
Location
Creek 34.31 16.75 30.5 13 - 72
House
 
33.58
 
18.89
 
28
 
12 - 81
 
Type
Diagrammatic-oral 32.88 19.19 30 12 - 81
Oral 34.79 16.8 33 13 - 72
Density (D), was calculated as the number of connections (C), i.
e., functional linkages, by the total number of connections
possible (Hage and Harary, cited in Özesmi and Özesmi 2004).
The number of possible connections is calculated by counting the
total number of concepts mentioned by an interviewee (N) and
multiplying this by N − 1 because in this analysis a concept cannot
form a connection with itself. The equation used to calculate the
density of each represented mental model is as follows: D = C/[N
× (N − 1)]. A GLM using a quasi-Poisson error term and a log
link function was also applied to the “density” score for each
expressed mental model to determine whether a significant
difference exists between the interview procedures.  
The house-based interviews elicited mental models that were twice
as dense as those elicited in the creek-based interviews (Table 3;
T value = 3.319, p = 0.0022, df = 33, SE = 0.2143). Twice as many
relations per concept were expressed in the house-based interviews
compared to creek-based interviews. No difference was observed
in the density of mental models expressed in the diagrammatic-
oral and oral interview procedures, and density did not vary across
the tested socio-demographic variables.
Table 3. Mean and median density value of mental models elicited
using the different interview procedures.
 Interview Group Mean Standard
Deviation
Median Range
Location
Creek 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 - 0.02
House
 
0.02
 
0.01
 
0.02
 
0.00 - 0.06
 
Type
Diagrammatic-oral 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 - 0.06
Oral 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 - 0.05
Analysis of perspective: comparison of specific and general
responses
The data were also analyzed to assess whether the different
interview procedures influenced the perspective interviewees took
in responding to the interview questions. In other words, from
what perspective, i.e., more “specific” or more “general,” did the
interviewee consider the interview topic and respond?  
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Analysis of perspective was applied to the oral transcripts by
documenting within the transcript whether the interviewee
responded in “specific” versus “general” terms. A specific
response was defined as a response whereby the interviewee
referred to a specific or particular instance of something, such as
a specific creek or process that takes place in a particular locale.
This type of response referred to a specific localized area or feature
of that environment. For example, the following was a specific
response: “One good thing about this area is that it can flood, the
water can come up but in a day or so it seeps into the ground or
just washes off.” In this case, the interviewee specified “this area,”
a particular locale, rather than talking about the effect of flooding
in general. If  the interviewee did not specify a particular instance,
the text was coded as a general response. A general response was
an idea without explicit application to a particular instance. For
example, a segment of an interview coded as a general response
was the following: “The leaves help the water to soak in and I
think it provides a mulch on the ground so that when the water
hits it, it’s not quite so fierce as when it’s hitting the soil itself  and
then the soil is eroding immediately.” In this case, the interviewee
did not apply the idea to a particular instance or explicitly state
a specific situation. The person was speaking in more general or
abstract terms about a process.  
Transcripts were coded line by line using NVIVO 8. At the
completion of the coding process, NVIVO revealed what
percentage of the total text document, i.e., the transcript, was
assigned to each node. It was then possible to determine what
proportion of each interview transcript was coded as “specific”
versus “general.”  
A GLM was again used to determine if  the different interview
procedures, i.e., the independent variable, influenced whether the
interviewee responded more in general or specific terms, or a
combination of the two, i.e., the dependent variable. Rather than
specifying a quasi-Poisson error, a Gaussian error structure was
specified, which defines the mean to variance relationship,
because the data displayed a normal distribution.  
The GLM analyzed the “specific” response data only because the
specific and general response data represented the percentage of
an interview transcript coded as “specific” or “general.” A small
portion of each transcript was also coded as “other.” The
proportion of an interview in which an interviewee responded in
a specific manner was significantly higher in the creek-based
interviews (median = 73.61%) than the house-based interviews
(median = 29.33%) (Table 4; T value = −3.135, p = 0.0036, df =
33, SE = 8.547). The proportion of responses that were specific,
or general, did not vary across tested socio-demographic
variables.
DISCUSSION
The results reveal differences between the creek- and house-based
procedures in terms of three of the four measures of mental model
content examined. Mental models elicited in creek-based
locations had more concepts and were more specific than were
mental models elicited in respondents’ homes. Mental models
elicited in respondents’ homes were denser than were mental
models elicited at creek sites. The number of functional linkages,
i.e., an index of causal relationships, did not differ across the
elicitation procedures or across tested socio-demographic
variables. None of the measures varied significantly across the
diagrammatic versus oral task or across the three socio-
demographic variables: age, gender, and occupational experience.
Although not based on an extensive data set, the results are
sufficiently robust to suggest some clear guidelines for those
seeking to work with mental models in an NRM context.
Table 4. Mean and median percentage of the interview transcript
coded as a specific response, as elicited using the different
interview procedures.
 Interview Group Mean Response (as
a % of the
interviewee’s total
response)
Standard
Deviation
Median (%)
Location
Creek 61.93 24.77 73.61
House
 
35.13
 
25.54
 
29.33
 
Type
Diagrammatic-oral 43.02 32.45 50.41
Oral 51.05 24.52 50.86
For many of the reasons already noted, we still do not know the
extent to which people have complete and largely preformed
mental models or to which they compile the mental models in
response to specific situations (Jones et al. 2011, Lynam et al.
2012). What the data do tell us is that elicited or expressed mental
models are highly situation specific both in terms of their content
and their structure. 
These results have important implications for those seeking to
elicit mental models in NRM contexts; depending on where
people are when asked what their beliefs are in relation to how
some element of the world works, we should expect somewhat
different responses. Mental models elicited in home environments
are likely to include more general concepts and be denser than
mental models elicited in field situations, which are likely to be
more specific and contain more concepts. It may be that home-
based interviews elicit more “core” or long-term aspects of a
person’s mental model, whereas field-based interviews are likely
to add to this core material more situationally cued content and
linkages. Further, because mental models can be partially
individual and partially shared (Lynam et al. 2012), the content
elicited in home-based interviews may lean toward socially
constructed and shared knowledge, aspects of creek behavior that
would be well recognized among study participants. We suggest
that the purpose of eliciting mental models should be an
important determinant of these decisions. For instance,
researchers or practitioners may be interested in understanding
the kind of mental models that will be brought into play in
formulating general plans, e.g., environmental management in a
region, or taking specific actions, e.g., restoration of a specific
creek.  
Consistent with the model of Lynam et al. (2012), we would expect
that where people need to rely on socially shared knowledge for
their mental models, i.e., in the absence of situated cues, as in the
home situation, the elicited mental models would be more similar
or consensual across respondents, this consensuality reflecting
the underlying shared conceptions. We have observed this for
groups that work closely together on issues (Mathevet et al. 2011)
Ecology and Society 19(1): 13
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss1/art13/
as well as those that share similar cultural orientations (Stone-
Jovicich et al. 2011). 
Mental models may also be elicited to explore the similarities and
differences in understanding to improve communication between
stakeholders (Abel et al. 1998). Specific mental models may be
elicited in the initial stages of a project to broadly scope
stakeholders’ understandings. Eliciting a greater number of
concepts provides greater opportunity for identifying overlap and
difference in the concepts that feature in stakeholders’ mental
models, as well as the links present or absent in underlying
dynamics. This provides greater opportunity for identifying
similarities and differences in stakeholders’ understanding.  
The elicitation of more generic mental models, on the other hand,
may be suited to research that deals with highly contentious issues
to better understand and work through the fundamental
similarities and differences in stakeholders’ mental models.
Communication is improved when there is a shared understanding
(Abel et al. 1998). Identifying overlap in understanding within
deeply held generic mental models can provide a solid foundation
on which discussions can take place. More deeply ingrained
differences are also revealed, indicating areas that may require
greater attention and focus in stakeholder interventions. Through
eliciting both more general and more situationally cued and
individualized mental models, practitioners and researchers may
be able to identify the common, i.e., shared, elements of mental
models, as well as the individualized elements, and through this
analysis establish the accepted and conflicted regions of the
mental models. 
Interestingly, we found no significant difference between the
interview tasks, i.e., diagrammatic-oral versus oral, in terms of
the content or relations of expressed mental models. This is an
interesting finding in that, theoretically, elicitation techniques that
use a combination of oral and diagrammatic tasks are believed
to tap two different modes of cognition: oral and visual (Kearney
and Kaplan 1997). We selected a diagrammatic-oral technique for
comparison because it was anticipated that it would assist
individuals to express their mental models and thus elicit more
concepts and relationships. Our findings do not support these
assumptions because no significant difference was identified
between the mental models expressed in the diagrammatic-oral
versus oral-based interviews. This could be attributable to either
the challenge of representing a dynamic phenomenon, i.e., a
dynamic creek, on a two-dimensional, static visual-based
medium, i.e., using pen on paper, or our small sample size.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that location is an important factor in the
elicitation of mental models. NRM practitioners should thus take
into consideration how the physical environment in which they
conduct a mental model elicitation exercise may influence the
mental models they elicit. The location of the interview can be
selected according to the aims of the research. In projects that
opt for situated elicitation procedures, it is important for
practitioners to account for the logistic issues, such as weather
conditions and site accessibility, that arise when conducting
fieldwork in natural environments. 
Our results found no support for differences in oral or combined
diagrammatic-oral procedures for eliciting mental models and
hence call into question the effectiveness of drawing tasks in
particular to elicit mental models. Further research is required to
determine in what research contexts and with which participants
drawing tasks work well. 
Mental models remain an important concept for NRM
researchers and NRM practitioners alike because they seek to
understand how people think about natural resources systems.
With care and sensitivity to purpose and context, currently
available tools and analytical procedures provide the means to
gain rich insights into the cognitive worlds of resource users and
managers.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6248
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